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Abstract
In a recent book  (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press,  2018), 
Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, 
thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s 
proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utter-
ances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses 
a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the com-
mon ground.
1  Stokke’s Definition of Lying and Assertion
Andreas Stokke’s (2018) recent book, Lying and insincerity, is one of the most com-
prehensive and up-to-date works ever published in the philosophy of lying. It cov-
ers a wide range of topics, including the difference between lying and misleading 
(ch. 5), the notion of bullshitting (ch. 6–7), and the analysis of complex forms of 
insincerity (ch. 8–10). This paper will mainly focus on one fundamental aspect of 
Stokke’s book: its underlying account of lying and assertion, to which the author 
devotes the first three chapters.
Stokke’s definition of lying was first introduced in his paper “Lying and Asser-
tion” (2013), and has since been one of the most influential in the philosophical 
literature. This paper shows that Stokke’s definition of lying is incorrect, because it 
is unable to draw the right distinctions concerning insincere performative utterances, 
and highlights some consequences for the broader ambitions of his book, in particu-
lar concerning its attempt to develop a Stalankerian account of assertion.
Stokke (2013, 2018) defines lying as an insincere assertion. His characterisation 
of assertion, in turn, draws on the account of common ground developed by Robert 
Stalnaker (1978, 2002). According to Stalnaker (2002: 716), “it is common ground 
that p in a conversation if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) 
that p, and all believe that all accept that p, and all believe that all believe that all 
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accept that p, etc.”. From this, Stokke derives his own account of assertion, accord-
ing to which you are asserting that p whenever you propose that p is added to the 
‘official’ common ground by saying that p. In other words, you assert iff you meet 
two conditions: (i) you say something (as opposed to merely implicating it), and (ii) 
you thereby propose to add what you said to the ‘official’ common ground. From 
this definition of assertion,1 Stokke derives the following definition of lying:
(DLS) A lies to B if and only if there is a proposition p such that:
(a) A says that p to B, and
(b) A proposes to make it common ground that p, and
(c) A believes that p is false
2  Common Ground and Performative Utterances
When Stalnaker (1978) first proposed to characterise assertion as a proposal to add 
a proposition to the common ground of a conversation, he stressed that not every 
such proposal is an assertion. For instance, if a speaker proposes her audience to 
accept p for the sake of the argument, or as a hypothesis, she is proposing to add p 
to the common ground without asserting that p. For this reason, Stalnaker (1978: 
323) specifies that his view should not be interpreted as a definition of assertion, but 
rather a necessary but not sufficient condition for asserting something.
Stokke’s (2013, 2018) project is to modify Stalnaker’s account so as to make it 
work as a definition. To avoid counterexamples, he needs to incorporate a criterion 
to set assertions apart from other speech acts with similar features, like assumptions 
and hypotheses. To this end, Stokke introduces a distinction between official and 
unofficial common grounds. Unofficial CGs are ‘temporary’ CGs that open up in 
order to store information that is used for the purpose of an argument; by contrast, 
official ones are, so to say, ‘permanent’ CGs. Assertion is then defined as a pro-
posal to add a proposition to the official, permanent CG, so as to exclude speech acts 
other than assertions (assumptions, hypotheses, etc.). This distinction allows DLS 
to classify assertions like (1) and (2) as lies whenever they are uttered insincerely 
(because assertions are meant to be stored in the official CG) and successfully dis-
cards assumptions like (3) (because assumptions are only meant to be stored in the 
unofficial CG).
(1) I fancy a beer
(2) Integers can be divided by zero
(3) Assume that Socrates is right…
1 In a footnote, Stokke specifies that he only wants to capture “the aspects of assertion that are relevant 
for defining lying”, and explicitly denies that his account of assertion is a definition of assertion (Stokke 
2018: 47). However, since DLS is meant to spell out what an ‘insincere assertion’ is, Stokke is de facto 
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While the notion of official CG succeeds in excluding the counterexamples origi-
nally individuated by Stalnaker (assumptions and hypotheses), it is not clear that it 
can help us distinguish, on a more general level, between insincere assertions (lies) 
and other insincere speech acts. To see this, let us consider some further speech acts, 
performed by means of an explicit performative utterance2:
(4) I swear that (4*) I have not stolen your Nutella jar
(5) I solemnly assert that (5*) I didn’t borrow any money from 
Mr. Dodo
(6) I promise to clean the toilet (6*) [I will clean the toilet]
(7) I command you to clean the toilet (7*) [you will clean the toilet]
Intuitively, one can lie by swearing, asserting, or promising something: it is natural 
to classify (4), (5), and (6) as lies if the speaker believes, respectively, that (4*), (5*) 
or (6*) is false.3 By contrast, (7) cannot be a lie, as it is not even clear what could 
make (7) insincere: if I utter (7) and I do not believe that you will clean the toilet (or 
I do not want you to clean the toilet), my command is perhaps deceptive, but cer-
tainly not a lie. Like the assumption (3), the order (7) should be ruled out by DLS. I 
will assume that a good definition of lying should count the insincere proffering of 
(1–2) and (4–5–6) as lies, and discard the insincere proffering of (3) and (7) as not 
lies.
Stokke’s definition is unable to deliver these distinctions.4 On the one hand, DLS 
is underdetermined: since Stokke does not offer a systematic account of how per-
formative utterances contribute to updating the ‘official’ CG, the predictions of DLS 
are in some of these cases (like (7)) underdetermined. On the other hand, if we try 
to develop a principled criterion to apply DLS to performative utterances, we are 
bound to find that none is compatible with our desiderata. In what follows, I will 
review four such criteria. Note that I will focus on criteria that can be extrapolated 
from Stokke’s own work (exception made for the clarificatory remarks in (A)): I will 
not be trying to show that DLS cannot be changed to deliver the right distinctions, 
but merely that every charitable interpretation of DLS fails to do so.
2 Explicit performative utterances are utterances of the form “I (hereby) [performative verb] that p”, in 
which the speaker performs a given speech act (promising, asserting, betting, etc.) by declaring that she 
is performing it. In the examples, the starred propositions represent the content of the speech act (what 
the speaker is promising, asserting, commanding), identified in a ‘non-descriptivist’ way. I will clarify 
what a non-descriptivist interpretation is in §2.A.
3 See Marsili (2016) for empirical evidence that laypeople overwhelmingly judge insincere promises to 
be straightforward cases of lying. Only Austin (1962: 11) and Meibauer (2014) have defended the oppo-
site view that promises cannot be lies. However, Austin presents this view only to proceed to challenge 
it (1962: 50, 70–1, 135–6), as part of a reductio ad absurdum of the distinction between constative and 
performative utterances (and the descriptivist semantics associated with it). Meibauer (2014: 76) merely 
states, in passing, that “we do not want to speak of an insincere promise or warning as a lie”, but pro-
vides no justification for this claim. Marsili (2016) has since challenged Meibauer’s view on theoretical 
(2016: §2) and empirical (2016: §6) grounds. In addition to this, Meibauer recognises that “it is possible 
to lie by using explicit performatives” (2014: 94), so that he would still agree that (4) and (5) can be lies.
4 To be sure, Stokke is in good company: as I argue in Marsili (2020), this problem is shared by some 
other influential definitions, namely deceptionist ones (e.g. Mahon 2008; Lackey 2013), and some other 
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(A) Descriptivism—Since DLS should exclude (7), a first tempting move is to dis-
card (7) on the ground that it fails to meet the insincerity condition (b). It is a known 
property of performative utterances that they are true in virtue of the speaker’s say-
ing so (Searle 1989). For instance, if I utter (7), it is true that I ordered you to clean 
the toilet because my saying so amounts to issuing the order. Since (7) is true and 
known to be true by the speaker in every context in which it can be uttered, it always 
fails to satisfy the insincerity condition (b), and it is correctly excluded by DLS.
This solution, however, is not viable (cf. Marsili 2016: 276–277, 2020: §2.1). 
Simply put, this strategy employs a ‘descriptivist’ interpretation of the content of 
commands like (7): the propositional content at stake for DLS (i.e., ‘what is said’ by 
the speaker) is identified with (7), rather than (7*). The problem with this approach 
is that it entails that no performative utterance can ever be a lie. This means that we 
cannot classify (4–5–6) as lies, against our desiderata. Much like (7), these utter-
ances are true in virtue of the speaker’s saying so; nonetheless, they clearly count 
as lies when uttered insincerely. The descriptivist strategy is thus bound to fail, as it 
prevents DLS from counting promises (like 6), oaths (like 4) and even explicit asser-
tions (like 5) as lies.
One may wonder whether the proponent of DLS can simply bite the bullet, and 
deny that performative utterances can ever be lies. I doubt that one can do this with-
out adopting a radically revisionary account of what lying is. To see why, let us con-
trast a plain assertion with some explicit performatives:
(8) I have already booked the restaurant for tonight
(9) I swear that I have already booked the restaurant 
for tonight
(10) I guarantee that I have already booked the restaurant 
for tonight
(11) I assure you that I have already booked the restaurant 
for tonight
Let the context be one in which I have not booked the restaurant, and have no inten-
tion to book it. If I were to utter any of the above utterances, I would be lying. This 
is a fact that virtually every ordinary speaker would recognise as uncontroversial. 
But the descriptivist is forced to deny it. He is forced to contend that choosing (9), 
(10), or (11) over (8) will render the speaker immune from the accusation of having 
lied. This doesn’t seem right. If something, by choosing to guarantee that I booked 
the restaurant instead of merely asserting it, I accept to be held even more account-
able for what I have said. Rather than preventing me from being accused of having 
lied, choosing (9–11) over (8) will render me liable to even stronger criticisms if it 
turns out that I had not called the restaurant.
In short, the problem with descriptivism is that it rules out also those perform-
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descriptive definition of lying (one that accommodates our ordinary use of the con-
cept, cf. Fallis 2009, 30–35; Mahon 2015), rather than revisionary account of what 
lying is (one that captures an artificial, philosophically engineered version of this 
concept), descriptivism is not a viable strategy to rescue DLS.5 A good definition 
should capture the insincere utterances of (8–11) as lies, as well as (4–6), and the 
only way to achieve this goal is to adopt a non-descriptivist interpretation of DLS.
(B) Syntax and truth-evaluable content—According to DLS, you lie only if you 
believe that what you say is false. Perhaps DLS can be rescued by maintaining (as 
some linguist do) that some performative utterances lack truth-evaluable content, so 
that in uttering them you cannot believe that what you say is false (and consequently 
you cannot lie). Above, I assumed that the content of (7), “I command you to clean 
the toilet”, is the truth-evaluable proposition (7*), “(that) you will clean the toilet”. 
But we may deny that this analysis is appropriate, while avoiding the shortcomings 
of  descriptivism. An alternative view is that the propositional content of “I com-
mand you to clean the toilet” is better represented, more straightforwardly, by the 
non-finite clause “to clean the toilet”. If this assumption is granted, we may then 
insist that (7*) is not truth-evaluable: there is no obvious sense in which it can be 
true or false.6 If this is right, (7*) cannot be believed to be true or false, and fails to 
meet condition (b) of DLS, in line with our desiderata.7
This syntactic criterion relies on the presence of infinitive to-clauses (as opposed 
to that-clauses) to draw its distinctions. This solution may seem promising, but it 
proves both too little and too much. It proves too little, because there are commands 
that take that-clauses under their scope, as (12):
 (12) I command that you leave this place and never return
6 Authors who reject the force-content distinction propose comparable analyses of this sort of cases (e.g. 
Hanks 2007: 150, Barker 2004: §1.5.1). For a more technical discussion of non-finite to-clauses, see the 
analysis of PRO elements in Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981).
7 For the record, this analysis is at odds with Stokke’s own account of how we assign truth-conditional 
content to sentences (Schoubye and Stokke 2016, rehearsed in 2018:§4). When it comes to determining 
which sentences have semantic content at all, Stokke takes mood, rather than force, to be decisive. He 
holds that “all declarative sentences […] are associated with a minimal content” (Schoubye and Stokke 
2016: 773), where ‘minimal content’ is understood to be truth-evaluable. Since (7) is in the declarative 
mood, Stokke’s own criterion would assign it truth-evaluable content. That noted, this solution still is 
worth exploring, to see if DLS (so understood) can accommodate our desiderata.
5 This is not to deny that there may be some truth to the descriptivist view, considered as a semantic 
theory of performative utterances: clearly, there is some technical (and perhaps philosophically interest-
ing) sense in which I would be telling the truth in uttering (10) (since I would in fact be guaranteeing that 
I have already booked a restaurant) and not in uttering (8). My point here is simply that, unless we are 
aiming for a revisionist account of lying, we should classify (8–12) as any competent speaker would—
that is, as lies, and not as truthful statements. This point can be acknowledged independently of whether 
one is convinced by a descriptivist analysis of these utterances (e.g. Bach and Harnish 1979, 1992) or by 
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It also proves too much, since there are performative verbs that can be lies, but that 
often admit to-clauses as arguments, such as promising or guaranteeing8:
 (6) I promise to clean the toilet
 (13) I guarantee to reverse the effects of my predecessor’s politics during my term
Perhaps DLS could be paired with a different view of semantic content that delivers 
the distinctions we need without appealing to syntactic criteria like the presence of 
that-clauses. We would need a view that denies that commands like (7) and (12) are 
truth-evaluable, and that classifies as truth-evaluable all performative utterances that 
can be intuitively be lies, such as (4–6), (8–11) and (13). Despite the vast literature 
on explicit performatives, however, no theory has yet been defended that draws these 
distinctions (see Recanati 2013 for an overview). Showing that such a criterion can-
not possibly be developed goes beyond the ambitions of this paper. But it is worth 
noting that the prospects for developing such a theory are not rosy: theorists seem to 
agree that a plausible theory of content should employ either syntactic features or 
direction of fit to set apart performative sentences that have truth-evaluable content 
from those who do not, and neither of these features can be used to set apart the 
two sets of utterances under consideration.9 In short, DLS cannot easily be fixed by 
deferring the relevant distinctions to theories of content.
(C) Felicity: According to Stokke (2017a; 2018: §3.9), if a proposition can be 
felicitously presupposed, it is good evidence that it is in the common ground. A 
felicitous presupposition is one that does not elicit “the kinds of repair strategy that 
are typically prompted by unfamiliar presuppositions” (2017a: 3), such as accom-
modation (as defined by Lewis 1979) and appropriate replies of the form: “What are 
you talking about?”. To test whether (7) can add (7*) to the common ground, then, 
one can check whether there are contexts in which one can felicitously presuppose 
(7*) after someone utters (7).
Imagine the following conversation between three individuals: Adolf, Beatrice, 
and Carol. Adolf commands Beatrice to clean the toilet by uttering (7), and then 
Carol utters (14), which presupposes (7*):
8 While English only seems to accept infinitive to-clauses for claims about the future, this restriction is 
not universal. It does not hold in Romance languages, such as French or Italian, where claims about the 
present and the past can be made by means of performatives that accept both finite and non-finite clauses:
• Affermo [di avere diciotto anni/che ho diciotto anni]
I affirm that I am 18 years old
• Je jure [d’avoir dit la vérité/que j’ait dit la vérité]
I swear that I have told the truth.
9 We have already seen that a syntactic criterion based on the presence of that-clauses would not suc-
ceed. A criterion based on direction of fit would fail for similar reasons: since promises, pledges, advices 
and orders have the same direction of fit, such a criterion would either incorrectly exclude them all, or 
incorrectly include them all. A somehow related alternative, delineated by Portner (2004), would be to 
differentiate between illocutionary acts that update the common ground and those that update to-do-lists. 
But also this criterion will not do: it will incorrectly rule out promises like (6), which update to-do-lists, 
as well as assertions and guarantees about one’s future actions (“You can chop the onions, and I will peel 
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 (14) When you clean the toilet, you should use this tiny sponge
Is Carol’s presupposition infelicitous? The answer is positive: whenever the felic-
ity conditions for performing (7) are satisfied (e.g. Adolf has the authority to issue 
the command), and Adolf’s command is successful,10 it is possible for Carol to 
presuppose (7*) felicitously via (14)—as in a military context in which Adolf and 
Carol are Beatrice’s superiors. This means that DLS incorrectly counts (7) as a lie 
whenever Adolf successfully commands (7) and believes (7*) to be false, against the 
desiderata.
(D) Proposals: It could be objected that the ‘presupposition test’ only proves 
that orders succeed in updating the common ground, but not that they are proposals 
to update the common ground. Perhaps by ordering (7) Adolf does not propose to 
update the common ground with (7*). Orders are not a matter of dispute: by uttering 
(7), Adolf updates the common ground, regardless of whether Beatrice and Carol 
agree with it. Since DLS requires that the speaker must propose to update the com-
mon ground, it could be argued that condition (c) is not met by (7).
I am not sure that this distinction does justice to the notion of ‘proposal’ invoked 
by Stokke. On Stokke’s view, any attempt to update the common ground counts as 
a proposal to update it (2018: 63–4), and he specifies that such attempts can be con-
veyed by any communicative act (2018: 221), including imperatives (2018: 207, cf. 
227–229). Hence, according to Stokke’s own understanding of DLS, orders like (7) 
are clearly proposals to update the common ground.
Furthermore, even if we were to modify DLS to understand ‘proposals’ as some-
thing that requires approval from the audience, we would fail to differentiate asser-
tions from commands. This is because also assertions do not require approval from 
the audience to update the common ground. When you make an assertion, such as
(2) Integers can be divided by zero
the proposition ‘that integers can be divided by zero’ is added to the common 
ground by default. The audience doesn’t need to express agreement (“That’s right”, 
“I agree”) for (2) to become part of the common ground. Assertions update the com-
mon ground unless challenged (Kelp and Simion 2017, 92). Challenges can be con-
veyed directly (“No, they can’t!”) or indirectly (e.g. by questioning the speaker’s rea-
sons, or frowning in disbelief).
Orders do not behave much differently. They do not need approval from the audi-
ence for their content to update the common ground. And they can be challenged: 
Beatrice may challenge Adolf’s authority to order (7) (“You have no right to tell me 
10 Of course then can be contexts in which Adolf’s command (7) is not successful (e.g. because Adolf 
is a patient in a mental hospital, with no authority of Beatrice). In these cases, it will be infelicitous to 
presuppose (7*) by (14). But this does not prove that DLS passes the test. For DLS to pass the test there 
must be no circumstances in which (7*) can be felicitously presupposed as a result of Adolf’s command. 
For this reason, discussion in the main text will be restricted to felicitous (successful) commands, which 
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what to do!”) or simply act in a way that gives away that she will not behave as com-
manded (e.g. laughing and walking away). Such reactions would make it infelicitous 
for Carol to presuppose (7*) with (14), just like a challenge (“No way!”) may pre-
vent an assertion like (2) from updating the common ground, making it infelicitous 
to presuppose (2) in the next conversational step.
Contrast the behaviour of assertions and commands with that of speech acts that 
are more literally ‘proposals’ to update the common ground. Suppose that Sam pro-
poses Gloria to go to the cinema with (15):
(15) I suggest that we go to the cinema tonight (15*) [we will go to the cinema 
tonight]
 (15) I suggest that we go to the cinema tonight (15*) [we will go to the cinema 
tonight]
Sam’s suggestion to go to the cinema is more obviously a ‘proposal’ to update the 
common ground: it needs to be accepted by Gloria before (15*) is added to the com-
mon ground. To see this, note that only if the suggestion is accepted it would be 
felicitous for Sam to say (16), which presupposes (15*):
 (16) I will wear my new shiny shoes when we go to the cinema tonight
Since suggestions like (15) are not assertions and cannot be lies, there seems to 
be no strong reason to interpret condition (iii) of DLS as incorporating a ‘weak’ 
notion of ‘proposal’ that requires approval from the audience. Rather, it seems that 
we should follow Stokke in understanding this condition in a broader way, so as to 
include common ground updates that are brought about by default, regardless of an 
explicit approval by the audience (after all, this is the interpretation that we need to 
capture assertions). If this is right, our initial worry about the ‘presupposition test’ is 
dissolved. Although the presupposition test is unable to differentiate between these 
two kinds of common ground updates, this distinction is irrelevant to determine 
whether condition (iii) of DLS obtains, given that ‘proposals’ must be understood as 
including both kinds of common ground updates.11 This, in turn, means that we can 
trust the verdicts of the test. The result is that our initial conclusion from section (C) 
now stands on even firmer ground. No matter how we attempt to revise DLS, it fails 
to reliably differentiate between the illocutionary acts (like assertions) that are lie-
apt and illocutionary acts (like commands and suggestions) that are not.
11 Could we adopt instead a ’strong’ notion of proposals, that captures only common ground updates that 
do not need approval from the audience? This revision would  exclude suggestions, which is a positive 
result, since suggestions cannot be lies. And it would preserve a distinction between proposals that need 
approval from the audience and proposals that need no such approval. However, this solution is not pref-
erable, for several reasons. First, it would not address the main problem faced by DLS, since DLS would 
still incorrectly classify insincere orders as lies. Second, we would be considering a revision of the notion 
of ’proposal’ that is inconsistent with most of what Stalnaker and Stokke say about assertion, so that we 
could not possibly regard it as an amendment of their view. Finally, this solution feels ad hoc: one thing 
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3  Conclusions
This paper has shown that Stokke’s definition of lying makes the wrong predictions 
when dealing with performative utterances. Unrefined, its predictions are too vague. 
Interpreted ‘descriptively’ (§A), it rules out several performative utterances that can 
clearly be lies. Interpreted ‘non-descriptively’, DLS fails to differentiate between 
illocutions that are can be lies (like assertions and oaths) and those that cannot (like 
commands and suggestions). Supplementing DLS with a syntactic criterion (§B) to 
limit its range of application also does not help, as it seems that no such criterion 
helps it to draw the right distinctions. These verdicts are corroborated by the ‘pre-
supposition test’, which was proposed by Stokke himself, and which confirms that 
DLS can capture deceptive directives, such as commands and suggestions (§C-D). 
No matter how we attempt to refine DLS, the definition either captures too little or 
too much.
One of the great promises of Stokke’s proposal was its ability to put to work the 
Stalnakerian model of assertion as a definition of what asserting is. Stokke’s solu-
tion was to revise Stalnaker’s proposal by introducing the notion of ‘official’ com-
mon ground, which delivers the required distinction between assertions and weaker 
speech acts (such as mere assumptions). But this paper has identified a further, sub-
stantial obstacle on the way of this ambitious project. We have seen that a plausi-
ble account of assertion should also acknowledge that commands, suggestions, and 
invitations are not assertions, and that Stokke’s ‘official common ground’ proposal 
is unable to draw the right distinctions in this respect, no matter how we attempt to 
refine it. It seems that Stalnaker’s worries about the viability of defining assertion in 
terms of a contribution to the common ground were founded after all.
The flaws identified in this paper thus run deeper than Stokke’s analysis of lying, 
and originate from inaccuracies in the characterisation of a more fundamental con-
cept, the concept of assertion. These are compelling problems for the book’s over-
all project. If lying and assertion are defined incorrectly, so are other concepts that 
Stokke’s book aims to characterise. Consider the lying/misleading distinction, dis-
cussed in chapter 5. We have seen that Stokke’s definition of lying is unable to draw 
the right distinctions between the speech acts that can be used to lie (such as assert-
ing, promising and denying) and those that can only be used to mislead (such as 
commanding or assuming). Any characterisation of the lying/misleading distinction 
based on such definition (such as the one developed in his chapter 5) will be inaccu-
rate in this respect. The flaws affecting Stokke’s characterisation of lying and assert-
ing are thus not isolated, but affect the whole conceptual framework developed in 
the book, which relies on them.
Incidentally, there are two  alternative definitions of lying that deliver the dis-
tinctions that DLS is unable to draw. According to  a first family of  views, lying 
requires warranting the truth of what one says (Carson 2006: 25–40; Saul 2012; 
another is  to carve this notion around the counterexamples, in a way that explicitly contradicts both its 
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Shiffrin 2014). A second, like-minded view is that lying requires undertaking a dis-
tinctive  commitment  to the truth of  a  proposition (Marsili 2014:  165–170, 2018; 
2020; Leland 2015; Viebahn 2017: 1377, 2020; Reins and Wiegmann 2021). Both 
views are able to distinguish the performative utterances that can be lies (such as 
promises and assertions) from the ones that cannot (such as orders or invitations), 
because the former set of utterances involves undertaking the relevant set of respon-
sibilities (be they identified with ’warrant’ or ’commitment’ to the truth of a proposi-
tion), while the latter does not (for elaboration, Marsili 2020, §3.4–6)). This means 
that counterexamples based on insincere performative utterances do not just show 
that DLS is incorrect: they also establish that DLS is inferior to competing defi-
nitions (warrant-based and commitment-based views) when it comes to determin-
ing which performative utterances can be lies.
To conclude, Stokke’s attempt to explain insincere communication within a uni-
fied framework is commendable, and the picture presented in Lying and Insincer-
ity fascinating and insightful. However, absent some crucial amendments to the key 
notions lying at its core (more specifically, to the relation between common ground 
updates and assertoric force) this picture is at best incomplete. Further work will 
be required to determine whether this conceptual framework simply needs to be 
amended, or whether assertion and lying are not essentially tied to contributions to 
the common ground after all.12
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